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abstract
In some discussions on global distributive justice, it is argued that the fact 
that the state exercises coercive authority over its own citizens explains why 
the state has egalitarian distributive obligations to its own but not to other 
individuals in the world at large. Two recent works make the case that the global 
order is indeed coercive in a morally significant way for generating certain 
global distributive obligations. Nicole Hassoun argues that the coercive 
character of the global order gives rise to global duties of humanitarian aid. 
Laura Valentini argues that the existence of global coercion triggers global 
distributive duties more demanding than mere humanitarianism, but not 
necessarily as demanding as cosmopolitan egalitarian duties. This review 
essay suggests that Hassoun’s and Valentini’s depictions of the global order 
as coercive entitle them to the stronger conclusion that there are global 
egalitarian duties.
Keywords: Egalitarianism, sufficientarianism, global justice, coercion, 
cosmopolitanism, statism.
1. INTRODUCTION
Coercion plays a prominent role in some current discussions on global 
justice. In these debates, the fact of coercion in the global domain, or its 
absence thereof, determines the kinds of global obligations we are said to 
have or not to have. Michael Blake, for instance, has argued that egalitarian 
distributive obligations take hold only among persons who need to justify 
to each other the coercive institutional arrangements that they are jointly 
supporting. According to Blake, such arrangements are justifiable only if they 
undertake egalitarian distribution commitments to those living under them. 
* Many thanks to Nicole Hassoun, Thom Brooks, Paula Casal and two readers for their very 
helpful comments and suggestions. I am also additionally indebted to Paula for her numerous 
editorial input and suggestions on structuring this review essay.
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Since, so Blake argues, the relevant kind of coercion in need of justification 
occurs in the state or domestic context but not in the global arena, egalitarian 
obligations are state-centric and not global in scope. 1 In a similar vein, 
Thomas Nagel argues that egalitarian obligations are activated only among 
individuals who are members of a shared coercive political arrangement. 
Since the global order does not constitute a shared coercive political 
association, global egalitarian obligations have no place in the global arena. 2 
I will consider the above to be the standard form of what has been called 
“coercion-based theories” of global justice. This is not to ignore that there 
can be variations within the standard form. In fact, there is an important 
difference between Nagel’s and Blake’s positions worth noting. For Nagel it is 
not sufficient that one finds oneself institutionally coerced for justification to 
be owed to one. In addition, one must also be regarded as a co-author of the 
institutional system in order to enjoy the standing to demand justification 
for the coercion. The coercive character of political institutions presents a 
problem of justification to members because these institutions require an 
“active engagement of the will of each”; they are institutions supposedly 
created and imposed in their name. For Blake, the problem with coercive 
institutions that introduces the problem of justification is the more direct 
one of systematic restrictions on personal autonomy (Nagel 2005: 129). This 
important difference is reflected in the way each responds to the objection 
that (restrictive) immigration policies of countries are coercive of outsiders 
wanting in. Blake’s response is that this coercion is not systematic and 
ongoing since it is not affected via a global institutional order but through 
the policies of individual states. So while immigration policies can be 
coercive of some people, it does not constitute coercion of the relevant kind 
(Blake 2001: 280). In contrast, Nagel’s response is that while outsiders are 
coerced by the restrictive immigration rules of particular countries, they do 
not have the standing to demand justification for this coercion since they (as 
outsiders) are not considered to be co-authors of these policies (Nagel 2005: 
129-30). 3 Despite this difference, however, both their arguments share the 
following form:
(1)  There is a standing moral duty to assist people deprived of basic 
needs. 
(2)  Egalitarian obligations, however, take hold if and only if there is 
coercion of a relevant kind that needs to be justified. 
1. Blake (2001); Blake further develops this account in his recent Justice and Foreign Policy 
(2013).
2. Nagel (2005). Blake’s and Nagel’s theses have attracted much discussion, including in 
the two books reviewed here. For one response, see Caney (2008). For a discussion on coercion 
and its connection to distributive equality, see Sangiovanni (2007).
3. A short way of seeing the difference between the two responses is that while Blake has 
to show that immigration restrictions are not systematically and legally enacted at the global 
level, Nagel has to show why outsiders are not properly co-authors of such policies. 
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(3)  The domestic order is coercive in this relevant way. 
(4)  The global order is not. 
(5)  Conclusion: there is a domestic egalitarian obligation but no global 
egalitarian obligation.
So while Nagel and Blake disagree about the conditions under which 
coercion becomes morally relevant (as specified under [2]), their arguments 
share the basic commitments that (a) coercion (under certain contexts) is 
necessary and sufficient for generating egalitarian obligation, and that (b) 
the global arena is not coercive in the relevant way. Two important points of 
the standard account are worth highlighting for my present purpose. One is 
that the claim that the global order is not a coercive order (of the right kind) 
is used to block attempts at extending egalitarian arguments to the global 
context. At issue is the specific matter of global egalitarian justice. The other 
is that it is not a point of contention that we have a humanitarian duty to 
assist people in dire need. More importantly, this humanitarian duty or duty 
of assistance is independent of facts of coercion. For Nagel, it is simply a 
“prepolitical” moral right persons have to be assisted under such conditions, 
and for Blake it is what respect for individual autonomy requires. 4 
It is not my objective to engage with Nagel’s and Blake’s theses in this review 
essay. 5 I outline them to provide a framework and context for discussing two 
recent books that attempt to derive obligations of global justice from claims 
about coercion. 6 What is common to both these works is their belief that the 
global order is a coercive order in a morally relevant sense. Although this is a 
rich claim in itself and deserving of extended discussion, I am more directly 
interested in the normative conclusions about global justice that these 
authors draw from their claims about global coercion. 7
2.  POVERTy AND GLOBAL INEqUALITy: HUMANITARIAN  
AND EGALITARIAN DUTIES
To start, let me clarify two different categories of global obligations, already 
alluded to above, that will be relevant to the present discussion. The brief 
remarks here will be mostly familiar but I rehearse them to make more 
concrete the backdrop of my discussion to come. 
4. See Nagel (2005: 127, 131-32); and Blake (2001: 258), here marking the distinction 
between concerns of “relative deprivation” (i.e. equality) that arise only in the context of coercion, 
and concerns of “absolute deprivation” that arise directly from valuing personal autonomy.
5. I attempt this in Tan (2006).
6. The two books I will review are Nicole Hassoun’s Globalization and Global Justice: 
Shrinking Distance, Expanding Obligations (2012); and Laura Valentini’s Justice In a Globalized 
World: A Normative Framework (2011).
7. Parts of the present discussion expand on remarks in Tan (2013).
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One global obligation is the duty to alleviate poverty; the other is the duty to 
regulate global economic inequality. We may call the former a humanitarian 
duty and the latter an egalitarian distributive duty. A humanitarian duty and 
an egalitarian duty are distinct kinds of obligations, both in their form or 
structure and in their objective. A humanitarian duty, the duty to counter 
poverty, is “sufficientarian” in form. It is non-comparative in that in that its 
benchmark is some non-relation threshold based on, for example, personal 
well-being, standard of living, or access to opportunities. And its objective 
is that of bringing individuals up to the defined standard of sufficiency. An 
egalitarian duty has a different structure. It is inherently relational, meaning 
by this that its benchmark is comparative. How well one is faring, from 
an egalitarian perspective, is not determined by reference to some non-
relational threshold, but by reference to how well others are doing. And 
the objective of an egalitarian principle is to regulate the comparative gap 
between the advantaged and the less advantaged according to some ideal 
of distribution. So while a humanitarian duty is discharged when persons 
achieve the target of sufficiency (however that is defined), an egalitarian 
duty is continuous and remains in play so long as there remain inequalities 
to be regulated. 
The distinction between humanitarian and egalitarian duties is 
not therefore merely semantic but in fact reflects the different forms 
and substantive goals of these duties. 8 In contemporary global justice 
discussions, there is a tendency to describe the latter as a duty of justice 
and a humanitarian duty to be different from duty of justice. Depending on 
how an author defines a duty of “justice”, such a characterization can often 
be helpful in reminding us of the different categories of these duties. So, 
what is more important is not how we label and classify these duties, but 
the awareness that these are structurally and substantively different kinds 
of duties (as described above). So for the present purpose, nothing turns on 
whether humanitarian duties are duties of justice or not. We can count these 
duties, humanitarian and egalitarian, as duties of global justice so long as 
their structural and substantive differences are kept in sight.
Now, taking an egalitarian duty to be conceptually distinct from a 
humanitarian duty does not mean that concerns of equality and poverty 
are independent of each other. It can well be the case that global poverty 
cannot be properly mitigated while significant global inequalities between 
8. Thus a humanitarian duty in this context should not be wrongly equated with charity 
or an act of supererogation. It is a moral duty and hence in this sense not optional. What 
distinguishes it from duties of egalitarian justice is its form and objective. For more on the 
difference between sufficientarianism and egalitarianism, see Casal (2007). For completeness, I 
should note that on this understanding of egalitarianism (as comparative), prioritarianism (i.e., 
prioritizing the needs of the worst off) is non-egalitarian. Here see Parfit (1997). 
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persons or societies remain a fact. In this case, the commitment to eradicate 
poverty results in an instrumental commitment to limit inequalities. But it 
is, however, also imaginable that significant inequalities can persist between 
countries without anyone or any society being impoverished. Or, put another 
way, even when all persons in the world are lifted above the poverty line, it 
is still possible, and likely in practice, that significant inequalities remain.
Below, I will first consider a coercion-based theory that relies on the fact 
of global coercion to support a humanitarian duty to protect and provide for 
the basic needs of persons, and then I will look at another that makes the 
stronger claim that legitimizing global coercion will require an obligation 
more robust than a duty of humanitarianism but less demanding than an 
egalitarian distributive duty.
3. HUMANITARIAN DUTy
Nicole Hassoun’s purpose, in her book Globalization and Global Justice, is to 
clarify the basis of the humanitarian duty to assist the global poor, and in so 
doing she hopes to provide a grounding of this duty that can overcome the 
libertarian objection that there are no positive duties to provide for people’s 
basic needs.
Philosophers typically regard the problem of world poverty to be less of 
a philosophical challenge and more of a problem of the lack of political will. 
In a sense this is right, for few people, politicians included, will openly deny 
that world poverty represents a serious moral failing for humanity. It is a 
failure to do what many people would say is required as a matter of justice. 
yet the seeming lack of political will in the global response to poverty is not 
entirely a non-philosophical one. This inaction has to do in large measure 
to disagreements about the causes of world poverty, and disagreements 
about the basis and therefore the content and limits of our humanitarian 
obligations to address a recognized global problem. Moreover, there remain 
philosophical hold-outs, in this case, global libertarians (as we can call 
them), who will deny that there is any obligation to assist the global poor. 
It is therefore not superfluous for philosophers to address and examine the 
source and content of the obligation to aid the global poor. At the very least, 
we can achieve greater clarity about obligations we believe we have. 
Hassoun’s basic claim is that since the global institutional order is coercive 
of virtually all individuals in the world, this institutional arrangement is 
illegitimate unless it also actively attends to the basic subsistence needs of 
individuals. For Hassoun, an institution is coercive if “individuals or groups 
violating its rules must be likely to face sanctions for the violation... Coercion 
usually creates conditions under which the coerced have no good alternative 
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except to do what their coercer wants them to do” (Hassoun 2012: 50). 9 She 
points out that institutions such as the WTO, NATO, and the UN create 
and enforce rules and arbitrate between rules, and hence are coercive on 
her account (ibid). These are institutions attendant to the phenomenon 
of economic globalization or whose significance and pervasive force are 
enhanced because of it. 
Granting this description of the global order, why does this present a 
problem of justice? Why is there the need to legitimize the coercive global 
arrangement? That is, and this is what Hassoun means by to “legitimize”, why 
is it necessary that people living under this order and subject to its coercive 
authority can see it as justified? 10 Hassoun’s fundamental normative premise 
is that failure to make legitimate this arrangement to people living under 
it would amount to an unjustifiable restriction of their autonomy. Because 
individuals are autonomous agents, any coercive arrangements impacting 
them —since they restrict their choices on pain of sanctions— that cannot be 
justified to them is illegitimate. What is needed to rescue our arrangements 
from this crisis of legitimacy is the consent of those subject to them. However, 
to ensure that individuals can consent properly to these arrangements, we 
must do what we can to “ensure that their subjects secure food, water, and 
whatever else they need for autonomy” (Hassoun 2012: 89). In other words, 
the duty to provide for the needs of persons derives from the duty to protect 
the autonomous capacity of agents, and the duty to protect this autonomous 
capacity derives from the duty to ensure that persons are in a position to 
consent to their coercive situation. In turn, individuals must be able to so 
consent if our global order is to be rescued from the crisis of illegitimacy.
It seems to me that the ideal of autonomy does double-duty in Hassoun’s 
argument. First autonomy explains why, as a default, coercive arrangements 
are problematic absent consent. Coercion is problematic, unless justified, 
because of its restrictions on autonomy. Second, the value of autonomy 
identifies the preconditions for the exercise of proper consent. Persons could 
not consent if they are deprived of basic needs. In sum: if the global coercive 
order is to be legitimate, it must enjoy the consent of those it is coercing (first 
autonomy argument). yet we cannot presume consent to be forthcoming, at 
9. Now the differences among coercion theories will be affected by how each theory 
understands “coercion”. For instance, for Blake, the normatively relevant coercion he has is mind 
is one that is legal, systematic, and ongoing. Thus he is able to argue, against his opponents, that 
immigration policies of a country are not coercive of outsiders in the relevant sense. As he puts 
it, there is “no ongoing coercion of the sort observed in the domestic arena in the international 
legal arena” (Blake 2001: 280). But the interesting difference between Hassoun and Blake 
concerning the global arena is not ultimately conceptual but empirical: they disagree over facts 
of the global order. Hassoun thinks there are global institutions that impose systematic and 
ongoing restrictions on persons (Hassoun 2012: 77ff); Blake denies this. 
10. For Hassoun, “Legitimacy ... is just a justification-right to exercise coercive force” 
against subjects who have a “natural right to freedom” (Hassoun 2015: 18).
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the very least, unless the autonomous capacity of those whose consent we are 
seeking is developed and protected (second autonomy argument). One can’t 
be exercising real choice for the purpose of expressing consent unless one is 
an autonomous moral agent. But because there are certain preconditions for 
agency without which we cannot possibly speak of autonomous agency, the 
legitimacy of coercive institutions remains in question if these institutions 
are imposed against a background where the preconditions for autonomy 
are clearly lacking. The lack of basic subsistence is just such a case. Thus it 
is important for the sake of winning legitimacy for our global institutional 
order that we accept an obligation to address basic needs deprivation.
As I will try to argue below, it is not clear what role exactly coercion has in 
Hassoun’s argumentative strategy. It seems to me that either Hassoun begins 
with a sufficiently substantive conception of autonomy in order to generate 
a concern with coercion of the kind she has in mind, in which case, so I will 
suggest, that conception of autonomy is also sufficient to directly ground 
a commitment to poverty alleviation (thus rendering the idea of coercion 
redundant); or she begins with a less robust view of autonomy, in which 
case it is not clear how this notion of autonomy can ground a concern with 
coercion of the sort that her argument needs (thus rendering the idea of 
coercion inadequate to her cause). 
To situate Hassoun’s argumentative method in the larger philosophical 
literature, consider Thomas Pogge’s account of our responsibility to address 
global poverty (Pogge 2001). For Pogge, it is the fact that the global advantaged 
are helping (in a variety of ways) to sustain a global economic order that is 
harming the poor that imposes a duty of justice on the rich to respond to 
the poor’s plight. The duty to address poverty is, in Pogge’s account, a duty 
based in justice to make good the harms that we the rich are inflicting or 
have inflicted on the poor. That is, the moral starting point for Pogge is the 
modest one that we have the negative duty not to do harm to others. It is 
our violating of this negative principle not to do harm that in turn generates 
our positive duties to address the plight of the global impoverished. So, the 
rationale for Pogge’s focus on the “factual” claim that the world order is 
harming the poor is that he wants an as ecumenical as possible a normative 
starting point, one that the libertarian can also find agreeable. Any plausible 
moral position, Pogge believes, accepts that we have a fundamental duty not 
to harm others, and thus the uncontroversial auxiliary duty to make amends 
for any harm we have caused or are causing. Thus his argument turns on 
the empirical matter of whether and how the world order is indeed harming 
the poor, and how the global rich are implicated as class in this wrong. 
Consider, in contrast, a different normative starting point, say that of Henry 
Shue’s which takes that we have as a basic moral obligation the positive 
duty to assist those deprived of basic needs (Shue 1979). On this account, 
it is immaterial whether the deprivation confronting us is caused by us or 
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not —the fact of its existence is sufficient for creating an obligation on those 
able to respond. My point here is not to get into the debate surrounding 
these two approaches, but to point out that it is significant for Pogge that 
he establishes the harmful or coercive character of the world order because 
of his modest normative presumption —that our sole responsibility to each 
other is to avoid interfering with one another.
Hassoun adopts a similar methodology in making the case for 
humanitarian duties in light of the libertarian objection. Like Pogge, she 
does not want to butt heads with the libertarian. Instead, she prefers to 
engage the libertarian on the libertarian’s own terms. But unlike Pogge who 
finds the meeting point to be the no-harm principle, Hassoun engages 
the libertarian’s concern about legitimacy, in particular, the legitimacy of 
coercive institutions. 11
But just as Pogge’s argument has generated interesting and lively 
discussions about whether or not he is implicitly relying on a philosophically 
substantial notion of harm to advance his case (accordingly calling into 
question whether Pogge has in fact reduced the debate on world poverty to 
a simply factual one), so a parallel question arises whether Hassoun is not in 
fact relying on a rather substantive ideal of personal autonomy to carry her 
argument. 12 Hassoun’s invocation of autonomy invites two possible queries: 
One is that her normative starting point need not be one that her opponent, 
the libertarian, will necessarily accept; and, second, given her substantive 
account of autonomy, her reliance on coercion seems normatively 
redundant. Let me elaborate on the latter first. 
Hassoun takes it to be important that the world order be exposed as a 
coercive one; yet she justifies her conclusion that coercion stands in need of 
legitimization because its potential blow on individual autonomy (in the way 
I tried to explain above). Indeed, she takes what she calls “The Autonomy 
Argument” to be crucial to her argument. Without this understanding 
of autonomy, specifically the preconditions of autonomy as defined, the 
conclusion that legitimizing coercion requires attention to basic needs does 
not follow. 
Here a question arises: if individual autonomy is that morally significant, 
why can’t we just draw the conclusion that we have the obligation to ensure 
that persons have access to food, water and so on simply because autonomy 
is impeded without access to basic subsistence without having to show that 
11. That libertarians should be consent theorists is of course a point of debate in the 
libertarian literature. Hassoun is aware of this, and engages the discussion on consent and 
libertarianism to defend her consent reading (96ff).
12. For some discussions on this and other matters of Pogge’s approach to global justice 
(which I will leave aside here), see Jagger (2010). Hassoun herself notes that she is proposing 
an alternative to Pogge’s account because of some difficulties surrounding what counts as 
“harming” the poor within Pogge’s theory (42-43).
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they are also being coerced? Indeed, several philosophers have made the case 
for a human right to basic needs on account of individual autonomy quite 
independently of facts about coercion or other prevailing possible wrongs. 13 
If respect for autonomy entails obligations to help provide subsistence 
in this more direct way, then the fact of coercion seems normatively 
superfluous for Hassoun’s objective since the ideal of autonomy already 
features in the argument. What is relevant is that the global order provides 
for people’s basic needs because individual autonomy is offended against 
otherwise. Indeed, Hassoun’s own explication of her thesis suggests this 
much. Hassoun’s argument proceeds in the following two steps that can 
be summarized as follows (Hassoun 2012: 89). First, autonomy means that 
persons have the “autonomy-based” human right to food, water and other 
means of subsistence they need “for sufficient autonomy”. Second, “to be 
legitimate, coercive institutions must do what they can to ensure that their 
subjects secure food, water and whatever else they need for autonomy” 
(ibid., emphasis added). But if there is an autonomy-based human right to 
subsistence, it is not clear why the presence of coercive institutions is seen 
as a necessary condition of the duty to provide subsistence. The fact of 
coercion seems normatively redundant. Anyone and any institution has the 
responsibility to assist those deprived, irrespective of coercion. 
Indeed, in the dominant debate on global justice, the fact of coercion is 
often presumed to be sufficient for triggering not merely humanitarian duties 
but egalitarian duties. In this regard, it is helpful to recall Michael Blake’s 
position for illustration. Blake takes respect for personal autonomy alone 
to be sufficient to ground the concern for people’s “absolute deprivation” 
(Blake 2001). That is, the respect for autonomy straightforwardly engages 
a commitment to provide for people’s basic needs. For Blake, the fact of 
coercion becomes significant not when we are asking about our duties in 
response to absolute deprivation but when we are considering a different 
question: do we have the duty to respond to inequality? That is, should 
we attend to people’s “relative deprivation” as well? It is only with regard 
to this question that coercion makes a normative difference —the fact of 
institutional coercion for Blake, coupled with the fundamental concern for 
autonomy, is what generates distributive egalitarian obligations. Blake’s 
point in his paper is that since there is institutional coercion in the domestic 
setting but not in the global setting, we can see how one can consistently be 
13. For one recent attempt, see Gilabert 2012. Gilabert argues that the obligation to assist 
the global poor stems directly from a cosmopolitan humanitarian concern, an obligation we 
have he argues independently of facts of coercion, association and so on. Hassoun herself in 
her book (Chapter One) offers a human rights based defense of meeting basic needs. This thus 
reinforces my question: what argumentative role is coercion really playing in defense of the 
conclusion that there is an obligation to meet basic needs?
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a domestic egalitarian and not a global egalitarian. One might push Blake 
on his claim there is no global systemic coercion, or even challenge him on 
the normative premise that coercion is the sin qua non of global egalitarian 
 obligations, but none of this rejects his view that there is a non-coercion 
based duty to provide for basic needs in virtue of personal autonomy. 
Hassoun in effect seems to have (unintentionally) raised the justificatory 
bar for global justice for even duties of humanitarian assistance have to 
be premised on facts about global coercion, which someone like Blake will 
not deem necessary. In short, in the main discussions on global justice and 
coercion, the dispute is not about humanitarian assistance but the stronger 
claim about global egalitarian obligations. For this reason, Hassoun’s 
method of argument —invoking coercion to ground not global egalitarian 
obligations but humanitarian ones— is a little disconnected from this main 
discussion and appears a bit like a self-imposed handicap. 
But this disconnect is understandable if we keep Hassoun’s main target 
in mind. As mentioned, her concern is the libertarian who will reject even 
the modest duty of humanitarian aid. Blake’s project to the contrary is 
explicitly directed at the liberal egalitarian who can accept the significance 
and implications of the ideal of autonomy. Such claims about autonomy 
will not hold sway with the libertarian, Hassoun’s interlocutor, who will 
simply resist the claim that respect for autonomy enjoins the obligation 
to provide for persons’ basic needs. The libertarian can of course endorse 
the importance of individual autonomy, but she will deny that this alone 
generates any positive obligations to provide for the conditions of the 
exercise of autonomy. So Hassoun thinks she needs to introduce the issues 
of coercion and consent in order to extend the normative implications of the 
libertarian ideal of autonomy. 
Confronting and responding to the global libertarian is not without 
use, and this is Hassoun’s motivating goal. Libertarians have been rather 
ignored in the debate on global justice for the most part since this debate, as 
mentioned, has largely focused on egalitarianism rather than humanitarian 
aid. Hassoun’s discussion reminds us that global libertarianism remains a 
serious philosophical position that needs to be addressed. 
In this regard, however, my second observation about autonomy’s role in 
Hassoun’s argument comes in. Unfortunately, it seems that Hassoun’s notion 
of autonomy is not one that the libertarian can endorse. As said, Hassoun 
wants to make the case that libertarians, who are themselves concerned 
foremost about the legitimacy of authority, will have to acknowledge that 
the global order faces a certain legitimacy crises unless individuals under 
its sway are in a position to give consent, and to give consent one must 
be autonomous to some extent. But she adds, as noted, that respect for 
autonomy requires that persons’ basic needs be met as a precondition for 
exercising autonomy.
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yet it is not clear in the end if Hassoun’s invocation of autonomy is 
really modest (or libertarian) enough to placate the libertarian. Built into 
her notion of autonomous consent are precisely the preconditions for 
autonomous choice that I believe many libertarians will reject. Libertarians 
who are also consent-theorists will of course require that consent be given 
freely and be non-rights violating. So clearly all libertarians will agree that 
a verbal agreement forced out of me under torture is no consent at all. But 
what about consent made under unfavorable economic circumstance? 
Whether such a consent is or is not freely given, or whether it involves 
rights violation or not, will depend on some background conception of 
individual freedom and rights, and many libertarians will disagree with the 
liberal egalitarian that consent under some economic stress is not freely 
given or is rights violating. So while Hassoun is on track when she says that 
the libertarian (who is also a consent theorist) will not approve of consent 
given under duress, she is too optimistic in thinking that the libertarian will 
agree that economic deprivation per se constitutes a morally relevant kind 
of duress. Libertarians might concede that a famished individual has fewer 
options in terms of what she could consent to, compared to another in a 
more favorable condition, but they need not conclude that such consent is 
thereby void. Certainly they will resist the claim that we therefore have some 
duty to improve the condition of the famished just so that her contracting 
situation is improved. The latter entails positive rights and duties that 
libertarians will not sign-on to. Hassoun’s conception of autonomy and the 
obligations that she attaches to it seems, in the end, to be characteristically 
liberal rather than classically libertarian. It includes positive rights that 
libertarians will find unacceptable. So in the end, it appears that a particular 
conception of autonomy, one which libertarians will find hard to endorse, 
bears the weight of her ar gument.
In sum, either we accept Hassoun’s ideal of autonomy (which is really 
a liberal rather than a libertarian conception of autonomy) and conclude 
that there is a duty of humanitarian aid directly on account of what it means 
to take autonomy seriously, in which case coercion is dispensable to the 
argument; or we grant the libertarian notion of autonomy, in which case, 
even the fact global coercion is not sufficient to show that there is any reason 
to take on positive duties of aid.
But if Hassoun does not succeed in her primary task, her careful account 
of how the global order is coercive in an ongoing, legal and institutional way 
has useful implications for the global justice debate. For if coercion provides 
at the very least a sufficient condition (if not a necessary one) for engaging 
egalitarian obligations, then her depiction of the global order as coercive 
entails egalitarian global obligations beyond the humanitarian assistance 
she seeks to defend. This is not to say that Hassoun must resist this global 
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egalitarian implication of her argument, but it is a conclusion different from 
what she sets out to defend.
Indeed, on the matter of global egalitarianism, one might further 
wonder if true consent of the sort that Hassoun demands (for the purpose 
of legitimizing global coercion) is realizable in the presence of significant 
inequality between consenting parties. On her own understanding of 
the conditions for the exercise of autonomy (upon which true consent is 
predicated), which I have suggested is a characteristically liberal rather than 
a libertarian ideal of autonomy, one could make the argument that excessive 
global inequality will compromise the quality of any consent about the 
global order. One need not be impoverished —being disadvantaged can be 
enough— in order to be made an offer that is difficult to refuse. Thus the 
legitimacy of global coercion, on Hassoun’s own principles, might demand 
more than a duty of humanitarian aid.
4. BEyOND HUMANITARIANISM BUT NOT qUITE EGALITARIAN?
The second coercion-based theory I will discuss will agree with my suggestion 
above that legitimizing global coercive arrangements will require global 
duties of justice more robust than humanitarian duties. But this account will 
disagree that these will therefore be egalitarian duties. Instead, it attempts to 
show that there is a third category of obligation that is entailed by the need 
to justify coercive global arrangements, and that this duty falls in between 
humanitarian duties and egalitarian duties in terms of its substantive 
content and demandingness.
In her Justice in a Globalized World, Laura Valentini makes the case for 
this middle alternative. She calls this the “third wave” in global justice which 
she takes to be distinct on the one side from “statism” that supports only 
humanitarian duties, and on the other from “cosmopolitanism” that enjoins 
global egalitarian duties. On her approach, “global justice requires more 
than statist assistance, but less than full-blown cosmopolitan equality” (Va-
lentini 2011: 20). 14
As with Hassoun, the problem of coercion is a crucial part of Valentini’s 
account. Principles of justice are principles that establish “when coercion 
is justified” (Valentini 2011: 4). But while Hassoun begins from the ideal 
of autonomous consent, Valentini begins from the notion of freedom as 
independence. For Valentini, principles of justice are those principles 
that specify the conditions under which coercion is acceptable, and 
coercion introduces this consideration because it “involves non-trivial 
restrictions of freedom as independence” (Valentini 2011:178). Since 
14. There is affinity of views here with Cohen and Sabel (2006).
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principles of justice have the function of regulating and justifying coercion, 
justice-considerations kick-in only among agents who are interacting or 
institutionally engaged with each other and thus liable to be coercing one 
another. The key claim in Valentini’s account is that the forms of coercion that 
provide the circumstance of justice include not just systematic coercion (i.e., 
coercion due to shared institutions people are imposing on each other) but 
also interactional coercion (i.e., direct agent-to-agent coercion) (Valentini 
2011: 15). As she puts it, understanding coercion more broadly to cover 
both interactional and systematic forms better captures “the multiplicity of 
constraints on freedom” (Valentini 2011: 154).
The significance of this distinction between the two kinds of coercion 
is that each requires different kinds of moral principles for its regulation. 
Systematic forms of coercion are formalized and institutionalized. They shape 
the moral terrain in which individuals interact with each other on terms of 
freedom. To make acceptable this background condition to all participants, 
the coercive formal system of rules must be regulated by some egalitarian 
principles in the spirit of ensuring that it equally respects the freedom of all 
participants. Interactional coercion, which is coercion at the inter-personal 
or agential level, demands different conditions of acceptability. Since the 
concern here is not with a background structure that is presumed to regard 
the freedom of all with equal consideration, egalitarian considerations 
don’t arise. Rather, since individual freedom can be preserved in case of 
interactional coercion in other ways —such as by interpersonal principles 
restricting or limiting intervention and by principles barring exploitation— 
egalitarian principles do not get activated. 
Valentini agrees with those statists who hold that principles of justice play 
the role of legitimizing coercion within the state. But her broader reading of 
the forms of coercion that matter for justice also allows her to regard the 
global arena as a coercive one in a normatively significant way as well, and 
therefore also an arena in which concerns of justice have a place. Thus she 
departs from statists who tend, as she correctly sees it, to limit concerns of 
justice to the domestic state. But because the moral condition (the forms of 
coercion, i.e.) in the global arena is quite different from the domestic one, 
the content of global principles of justice will be different from domestic 
principles. Specifically while domestic principles of justice will include 
egalitarian obligations, global principles will not. Thus her “third wave” 
of global justice that lies in between an overly modest statism and a too 
demanding “all out” cosmopolitan egalitarianism.
We will better appreciate Valentini’s broader reading of coercion and its 
significance to the debate by contrasting it with Blake’s, whom she regards as 
a representative statist theorist. As mentioned, Blake limits egalitarian justice 
commitments to the state because he takes systematic coercion to be the 
normatively salient form of coercion in need of justification. Thus while the 
 Sufficiency, Equality and the Consequences of Global Coercion 203
LEAP 2 (2014)
global arena, Blake can concede, is coercive, it is coercive in an interactional 
way and so does not present a normatively significant (for purposes of 
egalitarian justice) form of coercion. On this matter of the coercive character 
of the global order, Valentini departs from Blake for two reasons. One is that, 
contra Blake, she believes that the global order involves systematic coercion 
even if not in as encompassing a way as domestic institutions. She gives the 
example of the global economic system, which is an institutional order that 
systematically constraints the freedom of some people through its laws and 
regulations (Valentini 2011: 193ff). Second, as already noted, she utilizes a 
broader understanding of the types of coercion that create conditions for 
justice. Unlike Blake who limits his analysis to systematic coercion, Valentini 
regards interactional coercion as normatively salient as well. Accordingly, 
since the global order (as Blake will also agree) exhibits interactional or 
agent-to-agent coercion, as when one state intervenes or imposes sanctions 
on other, it is coercive in a normatively relevant sense for Valentini. In short, 
Valentini’s disagreement with Blake on the coercive character of the global 
order is on one front empirical (there is in fact systematic coercion) and on 
the other normative (interactional coercion morally matters too from the 
perspective of justice). The basic implication of all this is that the global order 
is one wherein concerns of coercion do arise as to generate considerations 
of justice.
Granting Valentini her broader understanding of coercion (which is 
instructive and illuminating) and her description of the global order as both 
interactionally and systematically coercive, I confine myself to this question: 
why aren’t global egalitarian obligations generated as a result? What is the 
moral difference in the forms of coercion in the domestic order and the 
global plane that can account for this difference?
The basic difference as Valentini sees it is that there is an encompassing 
institutional order or a basic structure (in the Rawlsian sense) in the 
domestic case that regulates and restraints individuals’ lives in a pervasive 
and profound way (Rawls 1971). Given the pervasiveness and profundity of 
this coercive structure, it itself needs to be justified as an entity. To render 
this shared system acceptable to all subject to it, society must guarantee all 
members equal political rights, equal opportunities, and adequate economic 
rights (Valentini 2011: 176). That is, domestic justice must include some 
egalitarian commitments (as noted for example by the equal opportunity 
commitment) if the systematic coercion that is inevitable in the state is to 
be acceptable to all. This is where Valentini concurs generally with the main 
statist accounts of domestic coercion and egalitarian justice. 
On the other hand, the global order exhibits a more limited case of 
institutionalized coercion, for example, through the global economic order 
mixed with more common instances of interactional coercion (as mentioned 
earlier) that occur outside of a legal structure. Since the systematic coercion 
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is limited and since the main form of coercion is interactional, the moral 
necessity here is not so much to justify a global institutional order as such 
(since there isn’t one) as to regulate the specific global systems (like the global 
economic system) and the various inter-state or personal conduct. So there 
must be principles of justice to render this condition acceptable to all living 
in it, but the level justification called for in this situation is, so to say, weaker 
and does not include egalitarian commitments to render it acceptable to all 
involved. Indeed, one might think that global egalitarianism will run counter 
to legitimate statist interests such as the independence and self-determination 
of states which are the preconditions for ensuring the freedom of citizens. So 
while statists are wrong to think that the global order is one in which justice 
has no place, cosmopolitan egalitarians are mistaken in thinking that global 
principles will just be domestic egalitarian principles writ large.
Valentini outlines some possible implications for global justice under 
this systematically coercive scenario that are plausible and sensible. They 
include ensuring symmetrical rules of interaction “with no profit exception 
for the powerful”, trade rules skewed to favor the less advantaged, certain 
redistributive commitments, compensating poor countries for “otherwise 
adverse effects of liberalization” for instance, greater accountability and 
regulation of global economic institutions and so on (Valentini 2011: 200-
201). These are just indications of what global justice would require and not 
meant as a complete articulation of the principles of global justice. They can 
be seen as a first sketch of what global justice would require minimally under 
her framework. But Valentini is also firm that whatever else will be required 
for global justice, it will not include egalitarian commitments.
Valentini does a thorough job pointing out how the global order is coercive 
both interactionally and systematically even if in a circumscribed way. But 
what seems a bit quick is her conclusion that the character of global coercion 
unlike domestic coercion does not activate egalitarian principles of justice. 
Why should this be so? Now it might be the case that interactional coercion 
is sufficiently regulated by principles of compensation, of forbearance, of 
non-exploitation and so on, and so there is no cause to introduce egalitarian 
commitments. That might very well be the case, and I will not pursue this 
point here. But what about the presence of global systematic coercion that 
Valentini also accepts? If systematic coercion in the domestic case generates 
egalitarian commitments (as she agrees), why does it not do the same in the 
global case?
It might be because global systematic coercion is limited and so is affected 
through specific systems or particular institutional orders and not through 
an all encompassing global basic institutional structure. But why would that 
translate into no egalitarian commitments? Why can’t these particular and 
limited systems or arrangements be regulated by egalitarian principles? For 
example, why can’t the global trade regime be governed by a principle that 
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says that the gains of trade should be equally distributed among the relevant 
parties as a default (with specifications on when departure from this default 
is admissible, as when it advantages the less advantaged)? This egalitarian 
obligation will no doubt be specific to the order or system being regulated, 
but it is still a global egalitarian commitment. So the fact that the institutional 
site that we want to justify and regulate is limited in its purview (regulating 
trade but not other aspects of global relations) does not alone tell us that 
this site cannot be regulated on egalitarian terms. It will just mean the global 
trade regime as a global institutional order should be governed by egalitarian 
principles. Why isn’t this a global egalitarian commitment? A principle of 
distribution can be egalitarian in pattern independently of the pervasiveness 
of the site that is applied to. There may be something about site-limitation of 
this sort that precludes egalitarian regulation but arguments must be given 
for this. The requirement that egalitarian justice must have an institutional 
site is not contradicted just because the relevant global institutions to which 
an egalitarian principle can apply are less pervasive and encompassing than 
the basic structure of domestic society.
It is not implausible that global distributive obligations will have different 
content from domestic egalitarian distributive principles, that global justice 
will not simply be domestic justice extended to the world. But, again as with 
differences in site, that there is a difference in content alone does not render 
global principles non-egalitarian. There are different ways of specifying an 
egalitarian distributive commitment, and a global principle even though 
differing in content from a domestic egalitarian one can still be egalitarian. 
Different egalitarian principles can establish different conditions and 
limitations of acceptable inequality. For example, Rawls’s difference principle 
is one articulation of an egalitarian obligation, and G. A. Cohen’s “equal access 
to advantage” is another (Rawls 1971; Cohen 1989). Thus, just as there can be 
different sufficientarian principles that will propose different conceptions of 
the threshold of entitlements or flourishing persons are entitled to, so there 
can be different kinds of egalitarian distributive principles with different 
understandings of the limits of admissible inequalities. A global distributive 
principle grounded on the fundamental commitment to individual 
freedom from domination can, we grant, limit inequality differently than a 
domestic principle grounded on the same fundamental commitment given 
the different ways personal freedom is at risk in these settings. But if this 
principle is in the business of regulating inequality for the sake of ensuring 
freedom, it is formally an egalitarian principle.
One implication of the above is that it is important not to assume that 
cosmopolitan egalitarians necessarily hold that global principles must be 
identical to domestic egalitarian principles. Some cosmopolitans may indeed 
have so argued but that is not what defines their position as cosmopolitan 
egalitarian. Cosmopolitanism is not a thesis about the content of equality 
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(to wit that global egalitarian principles must be extensions of domestic 
egalitarian principles) but a thesis about the reach or scope of egalitarian 
commitments. But egalitarian commitments can take different shapes, and 
there is nothing in the ideal that egalitarian justice has global reach that 
requires global principles to be replicas of domestic principles. One does 
not forfeit one’s cosmopolitan egalitarian credentials just because one offers 
a global principle that specifies the limits of acceptable inequality differently 
from a domestic principle.
To clarify, I am not arguing that global egalitarianism is the only defensible 
or plausible option. And certainly I have not suggested independent reasons 
for why a concern with coercion should create obligations of egalitarian 
justice. My claim is that given Valentini’s concern with coercion and her 
engagement with the statists for whom systematic coercion is sufficient for 
grounding egalitarian obligations, one would want to know more why she is 
able to resist egalitarian conclusions under these terms. 
Let me connect these remarks to the opening comments on the 
difference between egalitarianism and sufficientarianism. A duty of basic 
humanitarianism will have a lower target whereas a more robust duty of 
assistance will have a more demanding requirement, but both are essentially 
versions of sufficientarianism. Given that so-called statists in fact have 
different humanitarian targets in mind when they speak of “humanitarian 
duty”, their position as a whole is more helpfully described as a sufficientarian 
rather than humanitarian. One can disagree with a particular statist’s account 
of our humanitarian duty because it is too weak (covering only basic needs), 
and advocate instead a more demanding threshold (ensuring, in addition to 
basic needs, that members of a society can support functioning institutions 
of their own). But this does not introduce a new category of distributive duty 
—it is still a duty of sufficiency albeit a more demanding one. And just as 
there can be more or less demanding forms of sufficientarianism, so there 
can be more or less demanding kinds of egalitarian distributive justice. Just 
because one thinks that more economic inequality is tolerable globally 
than domestically (and therefore global distributive principles will have 
a different content from domestic ones) does not mean that one is not a 
global egalitarian if one is still in the business of regulating global inequality. 
Egalitarian principles are egalitarian because of their basic form —their 
comparative character and objective of regulating inequality— not because 
of their content or the way the limits of admissible inequality are specified. 
Presenting the contrast more fundamentally in terms of sufficientarianism 
versus egalitarianism, the interesting question is, contra Valentini, not whether 
there is a third alternative but what particular versions of sufficientarianism 
or egalitarianism to endorse. In the end, Valentini may well be able to resist 
the egalitarian impulse I gesture at, but this will mean that she is opting for 
a stronger version of sufficientarianism than basic humanitarianism (perhaps 
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something closer to Rawls’s duty of assistance) (Rawls 1999). Ultimately the 
dispute concerning global distributive justice remains a dispute between two 
basic forms of global obligations —egalitarianism versus sufficientarianism. 
Although this basic dispute is further complicated because there are different 
theories of sufficientarianism (some more demanding than others) and different 
theories of global egalitarianism (some more demanding than others), it 
remains essentially a disagreement between two different forms of obligations. 
There is no third category or third wave of global distributive justice.
5. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
Coercion-based theories are often invoked for the purpose of marking a 
morally significant difference between domestic justice and global justice 
in order to explain why it is that certain duties obtain domestically but not 
globally. These theories introduce both a normative premise, namely, that 
coercion is a sine qua non for certain obligations of justice to take hold, and 
an empirical premise, namely, that the morally relevant kind of coercion 
obtains domestically but not globally. In particular, in the current debate 
on global justice, these theories are invoked to explain why egalitarian 
commitments obtain domestically but not globally. On what I call the 
standard form of these theories, the premise that the global order is not a 
coercive institutional order in the relevant sense is in the service of an anti-
global egalitarian conclusion. 15 
Against these anti-global egalitarian arguments, some commentators 
have questioned the normative premise and have argued that there are 
other sufficient conditions for caring about distributive equality besides 
the need to legitimize coercion (mitigating misfortune, for example). So 
even if the global order is not coercive in the right way, there could be other 
reasons for taking on global egalitarian commitments. Another available 
response is to put pressure on the factual premise, and make the case for 
global egalitarianism by denying the observation that the global order is not 
a coercive order.
In their stimulating books, Hassoun and Valentini opt largely for the second 
route. 16 But what is interesting is that they do not go on to oppose the anti-
egalitarianism of the standard accounts. They deny the empirical premise, 
but they arrive at conclusions that are not, so they say, global egalitarian. 
In Valentini’ case, however, the engagement with the standard accounts is 
15. Again, I am referring to Blake (2001) and Nagel (2005).
16. So, although Valentini has a normatively broader reading of coercion, she also 
disagrees with the empirical claim of statists that there is no significant systematic coercion 
in the global domain. It is this particular observation of hers about the global order that I have 
focused on in my discussion of her book.
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clear in one respect. She wants to reject the statism that is characteristic of 
the standard accounts. The question I pose above, however, is whether she 
succeeds also in resisting the anti-egalitarianism as shared by the standard 
view. Hassoun’s coercion-theory fits with the standard debate less neatly. 
As said, the standard coercion theories almost always accept that there is a 
humanitarian duty in response to poverty. Their purpose is not to deny that 
there are such duties but to deny that there is an egalitarian duty in addition. 
Rejecting the empirical premise that there is no global coercion in order to 
derive a duty of humanitarian aid is to argue for that which the main coercive 
accounts already affirm. But if Hassoun’s project does not engage neatly with 
the coercion-based literature (as represented by Blake and Nagel), she also 
extends the coercion theory outside its normal confines, to challenge the 
libertarian who will deny that there is a straightforward duty of assistance. 
yet I noted that if the global order is in fact coercive in the different 
ways Hassoun and Valentini say it is, then on the understanding of the 
standard versions of coercion theories, global egalitarian commitments 
ought to be generated. Within this debate, making the case that the global 
order is coercive has more significant normative implications for our global 
obligations than what they argued for. 
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